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ABSTRACT 
The International Space Station (ISS) program is of such 
complexity and scale that there have been numerous 
issues addressed regarding safety of materials: from 
design to manufacturing, test, launch, assembly on-orbit, 
and operations.  A selection of lessons learned from the 
ISS materials perspective will be provided.  Topics of 
discussion are: flammability evaluation of materials with 
connection to on-orbit operations; toxicity findings for 
foams; compatibility testing for materials in fluid 
systems; and contamination control in precision clean 
systems and critical space vehicle surfaces. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The International Space Station (ISS) program was 
initiated in 1994 with the mandate to make as much use 
of the previous Space Station Freedom design as 
possible.  As such, there was a heritage of requirements 
already in place.  From this starting point, the ISS 
Materials & Processes function was established to 
control a number of safety hazards.  This paper will 
discuss a selection of these hazards and suggest how 
some areas of concern could be avoided / mitigated on 
future human spaceflight programs. 
 
2. FLAMMABILITY 
 
Flammability testing methodology has been an area of 
significant research evaluating the effects of 
microgravity on the combustion process.  Testing 
conducted and sponsored by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Microgravity 
Combustion Science Program (centered at the NASA 
Glenn Research Center) and the extensive work 
conducted in Russia, Europe, and Japan have shown that 
materials combustion characteristics in microgravity are 
quite different than those observed using the standard 
test methods required by the NASA,  the Russian Space 
Agency, or the European Space Agency standards  
(NASA-STD-6001, P17375-082, or ECSS-Q-70-21A, 
respectively).  As an end-user of the data, the general 
microgravity combustion findings are quite comforting 
because they show that the long-established test 
conditions used for the evaluation of materials 
flammability are conservative.  As such, when using 
materials compliant with the conservative test methods in 
our spacecraft designs, the best response to an on-orbit 
combustion event will be to cut power (remove the 
energy source) and to cut ventilation (limiting oxygen).   
Additionally, ground testing of flight hardware systems 
in normal gravity conditions is essential.  Since we don’t 
want an unexpected combustion event to propagate 
during ground testing, the use of the most conservative 
test environment from a flammability perspective is 
prudent.  Finally, the shear preponderance of test data 
under natural convection conditions will keep the use of 
data from the standard methods with us for many years. 
 
One of the areas left to the control of the individual 
human spaceflight program is the oxygen concentration 
conditions of operation, which will set the oxygen 
concentration used for materials evaluation.  For the 
United States Orbital Segment (USOS) on the 
International Space Station (ISS) program, three 
concentration conditions were identified.  Hardware 
associated with the Airlock interior was evaluated 
against a 30% oxygen, 10.2 psia test condition.  This 
condition was controlled by functional requirements for 
extravehicular activity (EVA), hardware and crew.  
Hardware associated with the remainder of the 
pressurized portion of the USOS habitable volume was 
evaluated against a 24.1% oxygen, 14.7 psia test 
condition, established by life support system 
requirements.  Finally, all other hardware was evaluated 
against a 20.9% oxygen, 14.7 psia test condition, 
established by normal atmospheric conditions for 
hardware up through the phase of hardware launch. 
 
After eight years of ISS operations, one lesson learned is 
that it may have been advisable for the entire habitable 
volume to have been designed and evaluated at a single 
concentration rather than two, even if the habitable 
volume was not expected to be operated at the elevated 
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levels associated with EVA.  Life support systems 
always have levels of uncertainty in their measurement 
of oxygen concentration.  Couple this measurement 
uncertainty with re-supply operations which periodically 
transfer oxygen to the pressurized volume on orbit, and 
we have had a situation where increased operational 
flexibility would have been available if the entire USOS 
had been designed and evaluated against a 30% oxygen 
concentration condition.  Of course, the trade-off in 
using an elevated oxygen approach is the impact to 
systems design.  Some parts of the ISS design may not 
have been able to show acceptable test results at 30% 
oxygen, requiring modification or significant materials 
changes. 
 
 
3. OFFGASSING 
 
Two situations regarding materials offgassing during the 
ISS program are of note.  Both have involved the use of 
foam materials.  Foam materials naturally have a higher 
risk of affecting spacecraft offgassing characteristics 
than do consolidated nonmetallic materials, because of 
the entrapped gas volume which can contain species 
from the foam manufacturing (formation) process.  It is 
recommended that spacecraft materials groups be 
cognizant of the offgassing hazard with foams, and to 
use analytical methods which are sensitive and reliable 
for the detection and quantification of formaldehyde and 
perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB).  These two materials have 
very low maximum allowable concentrations in a 
spacecraft habitable volume atmosphere.  For 
formaldehyde, it is recommended to test materials using 
ASTM D5197-03, Standard Method for the 
Determination of Formaldehyde and Other Carbonyl 
Compounds in Air.  No special method in testing for the 
presence of PFIB or other perfluoroisobutenes is 
recommended, only to be aware of the possibility for 
these highly toxic species and for reference, to please see 
the NASA Advisory #NA-JSC-2004-03. 
 
4. COMPATIBILITY IN FLUID SYSTEMS 
 
The ISS program conducted extensive evaluation of 
internal thermal control system coolant compatibility 
with the system materials of construction.  This work 
was done not only during qualification of the system 
hardware design, but also later when an unexpected 
change in the coolant chemistry occurred during on-orbit 
operations.  The pH of the system coolant dropped a full 
unit because of lack of robustness in the coolant’s 
buffering capacity, and this decrease in pH was 
accompanied by corrosion concerns and commensurate 
safety concerns.  After years of immersion testing to 
understand the corrosion and performance life risks 
associated with the ISS internal thermal control system, 
we found that the preliminary electrochemical methods 
that we used early in our test program were actually very 
good and in close agreement with the long-term 
immersion testing.  Those methods were ASTM G5, 
Standard Reference Test Method for making 
Potentiostatic and Potentiodynamic Anodic Polarization 
Measurements, and ASTM G59, Standard Test Method 
for Conducting Potentiodynamic Polarization Resistance 
Measurements. 
 
Most fluid systems compatibility requirements (such as 
in NASA-STD-6001, Test 15) are only for the evaluation 
of gross compatibility, where the exposure time is 
limited to hours, and is only intended to assure that there 
will be no immediate unintended chemical reaction.  But 
for long-lived spacecraft designs, generally designed and 
built with severe weight and volume limits, other types 
of tests must be conducted to evaluate system failure 
risk.  In general, those tests are immersion tests with the 
only real opportunity for acceleration being through the 
use of increased temperature (if an Arrhenius 
relationship holds for the specific condition, which is not 
always the case).  For corrosion testing, the ISS materials 
team developed additional confidence in the use of cyclic 
potentiodynamic polarization scanning for quickly 
evaluating corrosion risks. 
 
5. PARTICULATE CONTAMINATION 
CONTROL 
 
The habitable volume of ISS has a surface cleanliness 
requirement of “visibly clean – sensitive”, as defined by 
NASA standard SN-C-0005, Contamination Control 
Requirements.  Essentially, this requirement means that 
pressurized element surfaces have to be clean enough to 
exhibit no visible particles at an arm’s length distance 
and under reasonably bright illumination.  The 
requirement is for both vehicle and crew safety.  
Although this requirement has been in place since the 
beginning of the ISS program, verification of compliance 
can be a problem.  Complex systems built with intent to 
absolutely minimize volume can lead to inspection 
difficulties.  The cleaning process itself can be tedious 
and time consuming, and consequently an impact to cost 
and schedule.  Based on problem areas that have been 
observed during the ISS program, it appears that the root 
cause in many of these situations lies in the intent to do a 
thorough cleaning at the end of all hardware processing.  
From ISS experience, saving the cleanup task to the end 
of the manufacturing flow is not effective.  “Clean as you 
go” is the only way to go.  Cleaning at the end of each 
shift is a good practice, but these regular cleanings are 
especially critical prior to hardware manipulations or 
reorientations.  Hardware movements will redistribute 
contamination, sometimes from removable/cleanable 
areas to inaccessible areas. 
 
It is also important to be on the lookout for particulate 
traps in the design configuration which may require 
specialized tools or even some disassembly in order to be 
cleaned and inspected thoroughly.  Match drilling 
operations have been found to contribute the most 
hazardous particles, metal shavings.  So the use of 
particulate generating processes at the assembly level 
must be closely scrutinized for all possible locations 
where particulate could be distributed.  Despite the 
inevitable schedule pressures, the discipline to perform 
regular cleaning operations and prevent contamination 
redistribution will pay off in the end. 
 
Flexhoses need special attention if precision cleaned.  
Most fluid systems on ISS are cleaned to Level 200A or 
300A per MIL-STD-1246, Product Cleanliness Levels 
and Contamination Control Program.  The convolutions 
form natural traps, not only for particulate and 
nonvolatile residue but also for the cleaning fluid (which 
may itself be an unacceptable contaminant in the fluid 
system).  Flexhoses should be cleaned and verified clean 
in a vertical orientation.  For hoses of reasonably large 
dimension (>2.5 cm), the cleaning and verification test 
fluid should be applied internally through use of a high 
pressure nozzle to the entire length of the flexhose. 
 
Most importantly, particulate contamination control is a 
matter of training.  All personnel working around 
precision cleaned hardware must be sensitive to avoiding 
the costs and risks associated with finding a 
contamination problem that could have been dealt with 
through up-front assessment and reasonable discipline.  
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The shear size and multi-system complexity of the ISS 
program provided a number of opportunities for the 
materials community to learn, dealing with issues from 
the earliest requirements definition phase through our 
current sequence of the final assembly flights and the 
operations phase.  It is hoped that this selection of 
lessons learned will have value to those involved with 
our continued forays away from our planet and into the 
black. 
